

APPEAL NO. 031904
FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on June 18, 2003. The hearing officer decided that the respondent's (claimant herein) compensable injury of _____, includes an injury to the claimant's cervical spine and right knee. The appellant (carrier herein) files a request for review in which it argues that the hearing officer failed to explain his rationale for deciding the case and that the evidence did not support the decision of the hearing officer. The claimant responds that the evidence supported the decision of the hearing officer.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

In his decision the hearing officer states, "Even though all the evidence was not discussed, it was considered." We have previously stated that there is no requirement that the hearing officer discuss all the evidence. See Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91076, decided December 31, 1991; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92185, decided June 18, 1992. The hearing officer has explained the rationale of his decision stating as follows:

Claimant sustained compensable injuries when she fell on _____. The persuasive evidence indicated that she injured her cervical spine and right knee as a result that [sic] fall.

We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision

for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**MR. RUSSELL R. OLIVER, PRESIDENT
221 WEST 6TH STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Robert W. Potts
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge